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66WAJHAT GOES UP must also come down." While
V modern space technology has proven that there
are exceptions to this old adage, it remains true with re-
spect to modern air travel. Any aircraft en route to its
intended destination will eventually return to earth. How-
ever, there is always the very real possibility that the man-
ner of its return will result in the tragic consequence of
injury or death to its passengers.
To be sure, the odds are great that any given flight will
reach its destination safely.' As technology has improved
over the years, aircraft manufacturers have made substan-
tial progress in improving the "airworthiness" of their
products.2 Through such improvements, the overall acci-
dent rate in both general aviation 3 and commercial avia-
tion' aircraft has gradually dropped.- However, man has
yet to design and manufacture an aircraft which is crash-
See Nolan, Airline Safety: The Shocking Truth, DISCOVER, Oct. 1986, at 30. Ac-
cording to the author, "[i]f 374 people in New York board a 747 for California,
the chances are 99.99995 percent they'll all arrive alive". Id. at 32.
2 See Saba, Aircraft Crashworthiness in the United States: Some Legal and Technical Pa-
rameters, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 287 (1983).
.4 "General aviation aircraft may be defined as aircraft certified under 14 CFR
23 and predecessor regulations, having a gross weight of 12,500 pounds or less."
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, SAFETY REPORT: THE STATUS OF GEN-
ERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS 1 n.l (1980) [hereinafter SAFETY
REPORT].
"Commercial aviation" aircraft may be defined as aircraft which the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) designates as transport category aircraft under 14
219
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proof. Consequently, aviation accidents still occur at un-
acceptable rates.6 When these accidents do occur, they
are responsible for an inordinate number of injuries and
deaths. For instance, one commentator notes that deaths
per passenger mile of flight in general aviation aircraft are
eight times as great as deaths per passenger mile of travel
in automobiles.7 While one may not find these figures to
be particularly surprising given the speed and altitude of
modern air travel, recent studies of aviation disasters
show that most accidents occur during the takeoff, ap-
proach, and landing phases of the flight, when the aircraft
is traveling at a relatively slow speed and low altitude.8
Under these circumstances, the aircraft cabin and its occu-
pants may well remain intact upon initial impact.9 Yet, in
many instances, the passengers of these aircraft fall victim
to any number of subsequent injury-causing events'0
which may be attributed to the manufacturer's failure to
design the aircraft so that it could withstand such a colli-
sion." When this is the case, the injured parties may at-
tempt to seek recovery against the manufacturer or
operator of the aircraft under the doctrine of
"crashworthiness."12
C.F.R. §§ 25.1-.1587 (1986). Note, The Crashworthiness Doctrine and the Allocation of
Risks in Commercial Aviation, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 n.1 (1979).
Saba, supra note 2, at 287-88.
In the period of 1970-1980 over 100,000 passengers in general aviation air-
craft were involved in 39,458 accidents. SAFETY REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. Stud-
ies have shown that
each general aviation aircraft manufactured will statistically be in-
volved in 1.5 accidents sometime during its existence, or giving con-
sideration to the fact that a given aircraft may be involved in more
than one accident, it can be said that more than a 70 percent chance
exists of an aircraft being in an accident.
Schaden, Aircraft Crashworthiness, TRIAL, Jan. 1978, at 40-4 1.
I Schaden, supra note 6, at 40. As between general aviation and commercial
aviation aircraft, passengers in the former suffer fifty times as many deaths per
passenger mile as passengers in the latter. Id.
8 Saba, supra note 2, at 288.
9 Id.
to For a discussion of these hazards, see infra notes 118-200 and accompanying
text.
Saba, supra note 2, at 290.
" In some cases, the passenger may bring a suit against the manufacturer for
Put simply, crashworthiness concerns the degree to
which an aircraft is "fit to crash."'13  More specifically,
crashworthiness may be defined as "the ability of the air-
craft to protect its occupants from injury during the crash
sequence and to provide for safe egress from the wreck-
age." 14 Despite the continuous development and imple-
mentation of technology to improve airworthiness,
aircraft manufacturers have done little to improve the
crashworthiness of their products. 15 Understandably, the
best way to avoid crash-related injuries and deaths is to
avoid crashes altogether; nonetheless, neglect in the area
of crashworthiness is often responsible for needless inju-
ries and deaths in "survivable crashes.' 6
Often, the failure to design and build an aircraft to pro-
tect its passengers in the event of an accident is the result
of a conscious design choice by the manufacturer. 17 Un-
fortunately, aircraft safety must compete with other fac-
tors which motivate manufacturing and business
decisions, such as the desire to maximize profits.' 8 Many
design features that would greatly enhance safety are sim-
ply too expensive in the eyes of aircraft manufacturers
injuries sustained in the crash. See, e.g., McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal.
App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978). Often, however, the relatives of those
passengers killed in such accidents are the "injured parties" who seek recovery
from the manufacturer. See, e.g., Patillo v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 379 So. 2d 1225
(Miss. 1980). The doctrine of "crashworthiness" is often referred to in these
cases as the doctrine of "second collision" or "enhanced injury." Harris, Enhanced
Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C.L. REV. 643, 647 (1984).
13 Saba, supra note 2, at 290.
14 D. CATHCART, AIRCRASH LITIGATION TECHNIQUES 269 (1985).
' See infra notes 230-266 and accompanying text.
A "survivable crash" is one in which the deceleration forces upon impact do
not exceed human tolerance. Donnelly, Aircraft Crashworthiness-Plaintiff's Viewpoint,
42J. AIR L. & CoM. 57, 65 (1976). A particularly tragic example of needless death
and destruction in a survivable crash occurred when two 747's collided on the
ground in Tenerife in 1977. Experts estimated that most of the 583 deaths in that
accident did not result from the impact, and, therefore, could have been avoided
if the planes had been "designed and equipped with crashworthiness in mind."
Nolan, supra note 1, at 31. See CATHCART, supra note 14, at 276 for other instances
of survivable accidents which tragically resulted in injury and death.
17 See Nolan, supra note 1, at 50.
18 Id.
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and operators.' 9 Indeed, since deregulation of the com-
mercial airline industry, fierce competition among the air-
lines virtually dictates that each accord top priority to
profit maximizing, as opposed to safety-enhancing, air-
craft design.20
All of this does not mean that enhanced aircraft safety
does not have its allies. Potentially, the greatest of those
allies is the American judicial system. In the last twenty
years, American courts have armed themselves with the
doctrine of strict liability in tort.2 ' Under this doctrine,
the manufacturer of a defective product that is unreasona-
bly dangerous is liable for any injuries suffered by the ulti-
mate user or consumer as a result of the defect, even if the
manufacturer exercised all possible care in preparing and
selling the product.22 In easing the plaintiff's burden of
proof in a personal injury action, the doctrine serves to
shift the risk of loss due to defective products from the
injured consumer to the manufacturer, and, ultimately, to
other consumers of the products.23 Aside from shifting
the risk of loss resulting from defect-related injuries, an-
other important justification for the doctrine is its ten-
dency to provide an incentive for manufacturers to
produce safer products.2 4 A tort liability scheme that im-
poses liability on the manufacturer for every injury caused
by a defect in one of its products could potentially induce
manufacturers to go to great lengths to ensure that their
products do not present a danger to consumers, thus
19 Id. For example, seats and upholstery which better protect passengers from
the force of a crash and the spread of a post-crash fire may well cost as much as
$22 million for a fleet of 100 commercial aircraft, not to mention that the added
weight of these features may increase fuel costs by as much as $500,000 per year.
Id. at 51.
20 Id.
21 The first case to apply the doctrine of strict liability was Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
24 Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
24 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). The influential concurring opinion of Justice
Traynor provides an excellent discussion of the justifications for imposing strict
tort liability upon manufacturers of defective products. See id. at 440-44.
serving to "discourage the marketing of products having
defects that are a menace to the public." 25
Despite the "safety-insurance" potential of strict liabil-
ity, the courts have not utilized the theory to significantly
alter the current cost-benefit analysis which often leads
aircraft manufacturers to conclude that it is less expensive
to compensate consumers for their injuries than to take
steps to avoid these injuries.26 While a few courts have
permitted recovery to aircraft passengers injured as a re-
sult of design features which have enhanced crash-related
injuries, application of the doctrine of crashworthiness in
aviation accident litigation has been far from prevalent.27
In fact, the doctrine, as it is presently applied, may be ill-
equipped to serve as a serious deterrent to the manufac-
ture and operation of unsafe aircraft. 28
A court cannot invoke the doctrine of crashworthiness
to allow recovery to a victim of an aviation accident unless
the victim's injuries may be attributed to a defect in the
design, manufacture, or operation of the aircraft. This
comment will discuss the manner in which the courts have
addressed the difficult question of what constitutes a de-
fect, exploring and criticizing alternative standards which
the courts may employ. It will also discuss the extent to
which the current state of aircraft design, manufacture,
and operation has failed to keep pace with existing tech-
nology which could make air travel safer. Finally, it will
propose a means by which the tort system could prevent
avoidable injuries in aviation accidents by utilization of
the doctrine of crashworthiness in the aviation context.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF CRASHWORTHINESS IN AVIATION
ACCIDENT LITIGATION
The judicial doctrine of crashworthiness has its origin
25 Id. at 441.
26 See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
28 See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
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in cases involving defective automobile design.29 Since
1968, almost every jurisdiction in the United States has
recognized the doctrine in the context of automobile in-
jury actions.3 0 However, there is little recorded precedent
for extension of the doctrine to aviation accident litiga-
tion,3 ' despite the fact that there is virtually no basis
under the doctrine for distinguishing aviation litigation
from automobile litigation. The paucity of reported
29 See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). In
that case, the plaintiff suffered severe injuries in a head-on collision when the im-
pact of the collision thrust the steering wheel into his head. Id. at 497. He subse-
quently sued the automobile manufacturer, claiming that the manufacturer's
design of the steering wheel was responsible for enhancing the injuries he suf-
fered as a result of the accident. Id. The manufacturer maintained that it did not
have a duty to design and manufacture automobiles which are safe to occupy in
the event of a collision, and that it therefore should not suffer liability for the
plaintiff's injuries. Id. The court, holding in favor of the plaintiff, stated that a
manufacturer has a duty to produce a product "that is reasonably fit for its in-
tended use and free of hidden defects that could render it unsafe for such use."
Id. at 501. Although collisions are not "intended uses" of vehicles, they are "a
frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use." Id. at 502. As
such, the court held that automobile manufacturers are subject to a duty to design
products which minimize the injurious effects of such collisions, at least as much
as is possible "under the present state of the art." Id. Other cases have reached a
similar result with respect to automobiles. Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82
(5th Cir. 1974); Dryson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 41 A.D.2d 54, 341 N.Y.S.2d 846, aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d
151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973); Turner v. General Motors Corp.,
514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
But see McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.W. Va. 1971), aft'd, 472
F.2d 240 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973); Walton v. Chrysler Motor
Corp. 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
1o Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft and the Manufacturer's Liability, 13 AKRON L.
REV. 553, 557 (1980).
' Note, Aircrash Crashworthiness: Should the Courts Set the Standards?, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 371 (1986) [hereinafter Note]. For example, in 1982 there were
3000 aviation accidents resulting in 574 deaths, but only one reported decision
involving aircraft crashworthiness. Id. at 372 n.6. In this regard, the reader
should note, as well, that three of the four cases discussed in the section immedi-
ately following are unreported.
12 Perhaps the two most important justifications for imposition of strict tort lia-
bility are its cost-spreading characteristics and its tendency to create an incentive
for manufacturers to produce safe products. See supra notes 23-25 and accompa-
nying text. It is difficult to imagine how imposition of strict tort liability under the
doctrine of crashworthiness would serve these purposes to any greater extent in
the automobile context than in the aviation context. Certainly, imposition of strict
liability for enhanced injuries in aviation accidents would effectively shift the
losses due to these injuries to the parties in the best position to spread such
cases in the area of aircraft crashworthiness is primarily
due to the fact that most of these cases are eventually set-
tled out of court.3 3 Further, those cases that actually
reach judgment at trial are seldom appealed.3 4 Nonethe-
less, there are a few aviation cases which have allowed re-
covery under the crashworthiness doctrine," and still
others which have at least hinted that the doctrine would
be available in certain situations.36
A. Cases in Which Courts Have Allowed Recovery Under the
Doctrine
Although crashworthiness claims in aviation accident
litigation do not appear to be particularly prevalent, a few
of the plaintiffs asserting these claims have achieved re-
covery. Often, however, these cases are not reported and
there is little discussion regarding the propriety of impos-
ing the doctrine of crashworthiness in the aviation
context. 7
Some commentators believe that Smith v. Cessna Aircraft
Co. 38 is the first case to apply the doctrine of crashworthi-
ness to an airplane crash.3 9 In that case, James Smith,
David French, and their two sons were on board a single-
engine Cessna airplane which, during take-off, left the end
of the runway, rolled down a slope, and struck a barbed
losses. Further, such liability could serve as a strong incentive to aircraft manufac-
turers and operators to improve the safety of air travel, provided the liability im-
posed is costly enough. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
33 Comment, supra note 30, at 558.
34 Id.
35 See infra notes 38-70 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 74-105 and accompanying text. Mississippi is the only state
which has adamantly opposed application of the doctrine of crashworthiness to avia-
tion accidents. See Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss.
1974). However, this opposition does not differentiate aviation as a class, because
Mississippi also refuses to recognize the doctrine of crashworthiness in automo-
bile cases. See Walton, 229 So. 2d at 568.
37 See supra note 31.
3m No. 70-9255-L, slip op. (Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 6, 1972) (cited in Comment, supra
note 30, at 561 n.57).
3o See, e.g., Saba, supra note 2, at 310; Comment, supra note 30, at 561.
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wire fence. 40 The "crash" itself did not result in any sub-
stantial damage to the airplane or injury to the passen-
gers. 4' However, a post-crash fire in the cabin killed
Smith and the two sons, and seriously injured French.42
Subsequently, French and Smith's wife (as representative
of Smith's estate) brought suit against Cessna, seeking re-
covery under warranty, negligence, and strict liability the-
ories.43 For the most part, plaintiffs' claims centered
around the features of the airplane that aggravated the
passengers' injuries in such a minor accident.44 The court
ultimately allowed recovery to plaintiffs under these
claims.4
In Fuller v. Capitol Sky Park,46 the court awarded dam-
ages for injuries suffered when plaintiff's airplane crashed
as he was crop dusting a field.47 Upon impact, the seat
belt he was wearing failed and he was violently thrust
from the plane. 48 The force of the thrust and his subse-
quent impact with the ground resulted in plaintiff's per-
manent paraplegia.49 Plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant manufacturer, claiming that the defective seat
belt was responsible for his injuries.5 0 Despite the fact that
plaintiff's own negligence caused the accident, the court
found that the defective seat belt was the proximate cause
of the injuries. 5' Accordingly, the court awarded judg-
ment for plaintiff.5 2
40 Comment, supra note 30, at 561. In fact, the plane never left the ground. Id.
4 ld.
I4 d. Initially, Smith and French managed to escape the aircraft, but their sons
could not be freed. Id. Both sons burned to death in the plane, but Smith lived
for a period of five days before he died. Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the fuel line system was unreasonably
dangerous. Id. n.58.
4-5 Saba, supra note 2, at 310.
4,i No. 203674, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 1973) (cited in Saba, supra note 2,
at 311 n.125).





52 Id. Judgment for plaintiff was in the sum of $432,000. Id.
Four years after Fuller, a Nevada court allowed recovery
to a plaintiff in a similar case. In Eichstedt v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 53 decedent was a passenger in a Cessna airplane
which crashed into the wall of a canyon.54 Upon impact,
decedent's seat broke loose from the floor of the plane
and, as a result, he suffered serious injuries.55 Although
he managed to escape from the wreckage under his own
power, these injuries subsequently resulted in his death.56
Decedent's survivors brought suit against Cessna, claim-
ing that improper installation of the seatbelts in the plane,
the absence of shoulder harnesses, and inadequate
anchorage of the seats resulted in decedent's death. On
the basis of these claims, the jury found in favor of the
plaintiffs and awarded a substantial recovery.58
McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 5 9 presented the California
courts with an opportunity to apply the doctrine of
crashworthiness to allow recovery for injuries suffered in
a fire which broke out in a small plane after a crash. In
McGee, the plaintiff was among four passengers in a
Cessna airplane that crashed in hilly terrain shortly after
take off from the San Diego County airport.6 ° She and
another passenger were thrown forward and rendered un-
conscious by the impact of the crash, 61 but suffered only
minor injuries as a result of the impact itself.62 However,
the force of the impact caused the nose wheel strut, lo-
cated in the nose of the airplane, to collapse. 63 This col-
5 No. 282029, slip op. (Nev. Dist. Ct., Aug. 1977) (cited in Saba, supra note 2,
at 311 n.128).
- Comment, supra note 30 at 562.
.55 Id.
56 Id.
.57 Id. The claims sought recovery under warranty, negligence, and strict liabil-
ity theories. Id.
58 Id. The jury awarded plaintiffs the sum of $900,000. Id. Again, as in the
previous cases, the court's opinion was not reported.
-' 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978).
' 147 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
Id. Each of the occupants was wearing a seatbelt, but there were no shoulder
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lapse ruptured a fuel tank which was located in the nose,
and caused fuel to escape into a combustible area.64 The
resulting fire reached the cabin almost immediately.65
The two conscious passengers managed to escape the air-
craft and pull the unconscious passengers to safety, bit
plaintiff suffered severe burns on her legs as a result of
the fire.66 She brought suit against Cessna, asserting strict
liability and negligence claims. At trial, the jury found
in favor of Cessna on these claims and refused to grant
recovery.8 On appeal, the court of appeals rejected
Cessna's contention that the crashworthiness doctrine
should not apply to aircraft manufacturers, 69 and held
that the design of the airplane's fuel system could be eval-
uated under principles of strict liability in tort.70
In assessing Cessna's potential liability in this case, the
court applied the concept of crashworthiness, which it had
previously accepted in the context of automobile crash lit-
igation.7 ' It ruled, as it had in previous automobile cases,
that a manufacturer has a duty to foresee some misuse of
its products, and to take reasonable precautions to en-
hance the safety of any person who might be endangered
- Id. Cessna had designed the airplane to contain an "accumulator tank" in
the nose, near the cockpit. Id. This tank essentially "intercepted" the flow of
gasoline from the fuel tanks in the wings to the engine and carburetor in the nose
of the airplane. Id.
6s Id.
Id. The plaintiff suffered extensive third-degree bums on both her legs
which required amputation of her right leg just below the knee and of her left leg
just below the hip joint. Id.
67 Id. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that the fuel system's design caused the
plane to be inherently unsafe, and that the defendant manufacturer knew, or
should have known, that the nosewheel strut could collapse in a minor crash land-
ing, thus puncturing any fuel tank which might be located in the area. Id.
" Id.
ml Id. at 702. Cessna argued that the matter of providing standards for the
crashworthiness of aircraft is best left to the legislature. Id.
7,) Id. Ultimately, the plaintiff lost on remand. Comment, supra note 30, at 563.
71 See supra note 29 for a brief discussion of the doctrine of crashworthiness in
automobile accident litigation. California adopted the concept of crashworthiness
in the case of Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972). The Cronin court also held that the courts may award damages
in such cases under the doctrine of strict liability in tort. See Cronin, 501 P.2d at
1162.
COMMENT
by such misuse.7 2 When a manufacturer breaches this duty
by designing a product in such a manner that the prod-
uct's misuse results in injuries which could have been
avoided or minimized by a feasible alternative design, the
manufacturer may appropriately be subject to liability for
these injuries.73
B. Cases in Which Courts Have Approached the
Doctrine of Crashworthiness
In addition to those courts that have allowed recovery
to aviation accident victims under the doctrine of
crashworthiness, other courts have explicitly or implicitly
recognized that the doctrine is applicable in the aviation
context without allowing recovery under the doctrine.
The opinions in these cases may supply authority for re-
covery under the doctrine, provided the plaintiff can es-
tablish that the injuries he or she suffered resulted from
defective design of the aircraft.
In Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,74 an aircraft struck a
telephone wire shortly after take off and crashed. 75 As a
result of this crash, all of the passengers on board the air-
craft were severely injured or killed. 76 Plaintiff, as per-
sonal representative of one of the deceased passengers,
brought suit against the defendant manufacturer based
upon strict tort liability.77 Specifically, plaintiff claimed
that the passenger restraint system, which was not
equipped with shoulder harnesses, was a dangerous de-
fect which enhanced the decedent's injuries. 78 The de-
fendant manufacturer asserted that the restraint system
72 McGee, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 698. Specifically, "[tlhe manufacturer must evaluate
the crashworthiness of his product and take such steps as may be reasonable and
practicable to forestall particular crash injuries and mitigate the seriousness of
others." Id.
73 See id. at 698-702. In this particular case, the trial court, upon remand, ulti-
mately denied recovery to the plaintiff. Comment, supra note 30, at 563.
74 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981).
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was not defective and that the concept of contributory
negligence barred plaintiff's motion to strike the defend-
ant manufacturer's defenses which were based upon con-
tributory negligence.79
In its opinion, the district court stated that an injured
plaintiff may maintain an action to recover for injuries en-
hanced by a defective aircraft design, even though the de-
fect did not cause the accident which resulted in the
plaintiff's injuries. 80 Under the court's approach, a plain-
tiff may recover if he or she can prove that the defect is at
least "a substantial cause of [his or her] injuries," regard-
less of whether it was a factor contributing to the occur-
rence of the accident itself.8' The court noted that the
plaintiff in this case could recover if it could prove that the
crash which killed the decedent was survivable, that the
absence of a shoulder harness system constituted an un-
reasonably dangerous defect, and that the defect actually
caused the decedent's injuries. 82 While the court recog-
nized the propriety of recovery in the event that these
facts could be established, it further recognized that the
70 Id. at 1095. The defendant manufacturer asserted, inter alia, that: (1) the de-
cedent's injuries were due to his own negligence (decedent was the pilot), (2) the
decedent assumed the risk of such injuries, and (3) the decedent misused the air-
craft. Id.
Id. at 1094. The court stated:
A second collision action is viable even though the cause of the acci-
dent was not the defective condition alleged to have enhanced the
injuries. In a crashworthiness case such as this, plaintiff must prove
that the defect, though not necessarily the proximate cause of the
accident, was, at least, a substantial cause of injuries.
Id. (citations omitted). The court ruled that the Montana Supreme Court, if de-
ciding the case, would apply comparative negligence principles and, thus, would
reduce plaintiff's recovery based upon the decedent's percentage of fault. Id. at
1095. For a discussion of contributory negligence and comparative negligence,
see W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §§ 65, 67 (5th ed.
1984).
8, See Trust Corp., 506 F. Supp. at 1094. The court cited the case of
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973),
which established the crashworthiness doctrine in Montana. See Trust Corp., 506 F.
Supp. at 1094. Although that case involved an automobile accident rather than an
airplane crash, the court did not appear to have any difficulty in applying its prin-
ciples to the case at hand. See id.
.2 Trust Corp., 506 F. Supp. at 1094.
defendant should not be subject to liability for all of plain-
tiff's injuries.83 Instead, it stated that recovery should be
limited to the extent that the actual injuries exceed the
injuries which would have resulted from the accident in
the absence of the defect.84
Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp.85 involved the crash of an
airplane chartered to carry the Wichita State University
football team to a game in Utah.86 Upon impact, a
number of the seats in the cabin broke loose from their
supports. 87 These broken seats piled up in the front of
the cabin and blocked the exits.8 " Subsequently, a post-
crash fire swept through the cabin where the forty passen-
gers were trapped, burning thirty-two passengers to
death.8 9 The surviving passengers, and representatives of
the deceased, brought a products liability action against
the defendant manufacturer, claiming that the seat fasten-
ings were inadequate to withstand a crash, and that the
defendant manufacturer did not take proper design meas-
ures to minimize the risk that a post-crash fire would oc-
cur.90 While the Tenth Circuit affirmed a judgment in
favor of the manufacturer, it did not reject the application
of the doctrine of crashworthiness to aircraft accident
cases.9' Instead, the court based its decision upon its
finding that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof
13 Id.
84 Id. The court stated:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer
should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by
the defective design over and above the damage or injury that prob-
ably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent
the defective design.
Id. (quoting Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503); see supra note 29 for a discussion of Larsen.
85 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).





w Id. The plaintiffs proceeded under warranty, negligence, and strict liability
theories. Id.
1, See id. at 446-49.
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in establishing the fact that the airplane was, in fact,
defective.92
Unlike the court in Trust Corp.,93 the Bruce court drew a
firm distinction between design defect cases grounded
upon a theory of negligence, and those grounded upon
strict liability.94 Although the plaintiff in Bruce ultimately
failed to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the air-
plane's lack of certain safety features constituted a defect,
the court never questioned the fact that, upon a proper
showing, the plaintiff in a case such as this could recover
under a negligence theory.95 However, the court stated
that, under the applicable law, the plaintiff in an aircraft
design defect case could not recover in strict liability.96
The Bruce court's dichotomy between negligence and
strict liability with respect to the availability of recovery
under the doctrine of crashworthiness was not peculiar to
aviation accident cases. In fact, the court did not distin-
guish aviation cases from automobile crashworthiness
cases (which are now well established),97 but, instead,
stated that the same principles apply in both types of
cases. 98 Thus, the Bruce opinion is quite favorable for the
proposition that automobile crashworthiness concepts, to
92 Id. at 449. The 10th Circuit stated, "[T]o prove liability under § 402A [of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts] the plaintiff must show that the product was dan-
gerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary consumer." Id. at 447. In making
this determination, the court may consider evidence which tends to show that the
product was within the state of the art at the time it was designed and manufac-
tured, because such evidence "helps to determine the expectation of the ordinary
consumer." Id. The plaintiffs did not succeed in this case because they failed to
show that an ordinary consumer would expect a 1952 airplane to contain the
safety features of a 1970 airplane. Id. For a discussion of the "consumer expecta-
tion" standard for liability, see infra notes 201-214 and accompanying text.
w, 506 F. Supp. at 1093; see supra notes 74-83 for a discussion of this case.
1,4 See Bruce, 544 F.2d at 448-49.
, See id. at 445-47.
mi See id. at 448. The court, in holding as it did, stated, "Regardless of whether
the theory of § 402A of the Restatement should be accepted in other contexts, we
are convinced that it has no proper application to liability for design defects in
motor vehicles." Id. (quoting Volkswagen of America v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321
A.2d 737 (1974)).
97 See supra text accompanying note 30.
i" See Bruce, 544 F.2d at 448. Maryland does not recognize the doctrine of strict
liability in automobile design defect cases. See supra note 95. The court stated
the extent they are recognized, should be extended to
cover aircraft crashworthiness litigation.99
The Supreme Court of Oregon had occasion to con-
sider the doctrine of crashworthiness as applied to avia-
tion accident litigation in Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 100
In Wilson, the decedents were among four passengers in a
general aviation aircraft which crashed in the Cascade
Mountains near Oakridge, Oregon.10 1 All four passen-
gers survived the initial impact of the crash, but three of
the four died before rescue workers could arrive at the
crash site.' 0 2 Personal representatives of two of the dece-
dents filed wrongful death actions against the defendant
manufacturer of the aircraft, alleging, inter alia, that the
defendant's failure to provide crashworthy shoulder har-
nesses and seat belt attachments contributed to the dece-
dent's injuries.' 0 3 The trial court found in favor of the
plaintiffs on these and other claims. 0 4  The Oregon
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court,
but did not reject the doctrine of crashworthiness in deny-
ing recovery. 10 5 Thus, it appears that the court would
have allowed the crashworthiness claim had the plaintiff's
evidence been more persuasive.' 0 6
that "[this] principle is applicable to a § 402A case involving design defects in
airplanes." Bruce, 544 F.2d at 448.
See Bruce, 544 F.2d at 448
oo 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1977).
to, Id. at 1324.
102 Id.
1o3 Id. at 1329. The two front seats of the aircraft were equipped with shoulder
harnesses, but the two back seats, in which plaintiff's decedents were sitting, were
not so equipped. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the failure to provide shoulder
harnesses was an "unreasonably dangerous" design defect. Id.
1- Id. at 1322.
105 The court's reversal as to crashworthiness rested largely upon its exclusion
from evidence of two films which had been admitted at trial to demonstrate the
necessity of shoulder harnesses for safety in the event of a crash. See id. at 1329-
31. The court excluded one film on hearsay grounds and the other on the ground
that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. See id.
too Comment, supra note 30, at 561. The court stated that "[olne of the impor-
tant issues in the case was whether the airplane was dangerously defective because
of the type of lap belt assembly used and because of the failure to provide shoul-
der harnesses." Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1329. The fact that the court identified
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The cases in this section serve to illustrate the fact that
the courts have typically not drawn a distinction between
crashworthiness claims in automobile cases and similar
claims in aviation cases. 0 7 Still, the fact remains that few
courts have actually addressed the issue of crashworthi-
ness as it pertains to general and commercial aviation ac-
cidents. 0 8 As a result, there has been little opportunity to
develop a satisfactory means of determining how the doc-
trine should operate in the technical and complex area of
aviation. The next section will address the important and
difficult problem of determining whether a particular air-
craft design is defective for the purpose of imposing liabil-
ity under the doctrine of crashworthiness. 0 9
III. STANDARDS FOR DEFINING "DEFECT" IN AIRCRAFT
DESIGN
If the tort system is to determine whether failure to pro-
vide certain crashworthiness features constitutes a "de-
fect" for purposes of strict liability actions in aviation
accidents, the courts must develop a suitable standard
with which to make this determination. Unfortunately,
this is much easier said than done. There are many stan-
dards from which the courts may choose, but each has its
limitations." 10 Accordingly, the courts have failed to reach
a uniform consensus as to which standard to apply."'
crashworthiness as an issue and took evidence on the point is indicative of the
court's willingness to allow the claim. See id. at 1329-31.
,07 See supra note 32 for several arguments in favor of allowing crashworthiness
claims in aviation cases.
,o Although most of the cases in this section involve general aviation aircraft,
there is no real reason for distinguishing availability of the doctrine of
crashworthiness on the basis of the type of aircraft in question, and the author
knows of no court which has ever done so.
l,0 While the doctrine of crashworthiness should be available in aviation acci-
dents as it is in automobile accidents, the technical complexity of modern aircraft
may well justify application of a separate standard for determining what consti-
tutes a defect under the two types of cases. See infra notes 275-278 and accompa-
nying text.
I...See infra notes 111-228 and accompanying text.
[i Saba, supra note 2, at 319. For an excellent discussion of the various stan-
This section will identify the possible standards, and point
out the relative strengths and weakness of each.
A. Federal Regulations Regarding Crash Safety Measures
Over sixty years ago, the United States Congress real-
ized the need to promulgate standards regulating aviation
operations. 1 2 It originally assigned this task to the De-
partment of Commerce, which enacted the first federal
standards for aircraft in 1926. 11 In 1938, Congress sub-
stantially broadened federal authority in the area of avia-
tion safety, and reassigned the task of administering
aviation safety programs to the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB)."4 Twenty years later, Congress passed the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958, which established the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and made it responsible
for aviation safety." l5 Today, the FAA continues to ad-
minister aviation safety programs and to issue Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs), which provide minimum
standards for the aviation industry."i 6
Despite the comprehensive nature of the FAR's, very
few regulations specifically provide for .standards which
would enhance the crashworthiness of aircraft. In fact, no
FAR contains the term "crashworthiness."'' 7 Many com-
mentators note that those regulations which are related
to crashworthiness fail miserably to provide adequate
safety standards because they are outdated.'l i This sec-
dards by which the courts have defined "defect," see id. at 319-38. A great deal of
the following discussion is based upon this analysis.
112 SAFETY REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
it Id.
114 Id.
"5 Id. at 13.
1, The FAA, among other powers, has the power to promulgate "[such] mini-
mum standards governing the design, materials, workmanship, construction, and
performance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellors as may be required in the
interest of safety." 49 U.S.C.A. § 1421(a)(1) (West 1976). FARs issued by the
FAA are contained in 14 C.F.R. §§ 1-1262 (1987).
,,7 D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 269.
" See, D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 277; Dillingham, Crashworthiness FARs and
the Effect of Compliance in Products Liability Actions Involving Airplanes, 33 FED'N INS.
COUNS. Q. 55 (1982); Comment, supra note 30, at 563; Galerstein, Aircraft
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tion will discuss the standards embodied in these regula-
tions as they apply to important problem areas of
crashworthiness.
1. Structural Integrity of the Airframe
In order for the occupants of an aircraft cabin to remain
safe in the event of a crash, the cabin itself must remain
intact.' 1 9 If the force of a crash results in mutilation of the
frame of the aircraft, its passengers face the danger of be-
ing thrown from the aircraft or of being crushed. 20 Ide-
ally, the airframe structure of the aircraft should be
sufficiently sturdy to form a "protective shell" around the
passengers in the event of a crash, thus avoiding these
dangers. 121
FAR 23.561 provides a minimum federal standard re-
garding the ability of a general aviation aircraft to with-
stand the forces of an emergency landing.122 Under this
provision, the structure of the aircraft must be designed
to "give each occupant every reasonable chance of escap-
ing serious injury in a minor crash landing" when the oc-
cupant experiences an ultimate inertial force of nine "g's"
123 in the forward direction. 124
The minimum force requirements of FAR 23.561 are,
quite simply, unrealistic. One commentator notes that,
historically, the inertia force requirements in the section
date back to 1946.125 While the section requires protec-
Crashworthiness: Who Sets the Standard?, 28 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 258, 264 (1978).
One of these commentators states that the standards promulgated by the FAA are
"approximately forty years behind the state of the art." D.CATHCART, supra note
14, at 277.
Ili Saba, supra note 2, at 292.
121 Id.; see Thompson & Clark, General Aviation Crashworthiness, in AIRCRAFr
CRASHWORTHINESS 45 (K. Saczalski ed. 1975).
21 Saba, supra note 2, at 292.
122 14 C.F.R. § 23.561 (1986). For commercial aviation aircraft standards, see
14 C.F.R. § 25.561 (1986).
"2 The term "g" refers to the gravitational attraction upon objects at sea level.
SAFETY REPORT, supra note 3, at 5 n.5. This may be expressed as 32.2 ft./sec.2. Id.
124 Id. FAR 23.561 also requires that the structure be able to withstand forces
on the occupant of three "g's" vertically and 1.5 "g's" horizontally. Id.
" See D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 278. The author states that these stan-
tion for the passengers up to the ultimate inertia force of
nine "g's" in the forward direction, studies have shown
that the human body can withstand forty "g's" without
suffering broken bones and other internal injuries. 126
Clearly, aircraft structures which provide only the mini-
mum safety features required by FAR 23.561 will fail to
protect passengers in crashes which should, in fact, be
survivable. 127
Aside from the fact that FAR 23.561 does not ade-
quately reflect the ability of the human body to withstand
"g" forces, it does not recognize the modern state-of-the-
art in aircraft design. Experts have known for quite some
time that harder metals in the nose of the aircraft will de-
crease the likelihood that the fuselage will collapse in the
event of a crash, and will reduce the likelihood that the
nose will dig in upon impact.' 28 However, the FAA has
failed to officially recognize these developments, and the
regulation remains as it was forty years ago. 129
2. Passenger Restraint Systems
Aside from structural concerns, which focus essentially
upon the aircraft's exterior, manufacturers must also con-
cern themselves with providing adequate passenger re-
straint systems in the interior of the aircraft. Without
these restraints, passengers and seats may become "mis-
siles," which create very real hazards during a crash
sequence.3
0
FAR 23.785 recognizes these dangers by requiring that
each passenger in a commercial aviation aircraft be pro-
tected by a safety belt and shoulder harness. 131 FAR
dards "did not represent the state of the art at that time, and certainly do not
represent the state of the art decades later." Id. at 279.
126 Saba, supra note 2, at 292.
127 See supra note 16.
128 Saba, supra note 2, at 292.
121 See supra text accompanying note 30.
1- Saba, supra note 2, at 293.
,,, 14 C.F.R. § 23. 7 85(g) (1986). Specifically, subsection (g) provides as
follows:
Each occupant must be protected from serious head injury when
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25.785 imposes a similar regulation for general aviation
aircraft.13 2 The provision requiring a shoulder harness is
relatively new, but is a very important addition to the
safety requirements issued by the FAA.' 33 Without these
shoulder harnesses, simple lap belts would provide little
protection for passengers. In a crash, lap belts provide
restraint only for the passenger's pelvis, allowing his or
her head, torso, and appendages to fly freely about, possi-
bly being struck by flying objects. 13 4 Shoulder harnesses
allow the passenger's head, torso, and appendages to re-
main intact despite the force of a crash, reducing the po-
tential for injuries and fatalities. 35
Despite the potential effect of the shoulder harness re-
quirement in FAR 23.785(g), another provision in the
same subsection severely minimizes the positive impact of
this requirement. While each passenger is to be protected
by a safety belt and shoulder harness, these devices need
only be durable enough to withstand the ultimate inertia
forces specified in FAR 23.561(b)(2). 136 As mentioned
earlier, the standards in 23.561(b)(2) are inadequate to
provide even a reasonable degree of safety to passengers
in the event of a survivable crash. 137 Thus, FAR 23.785
suffers from the same flaw as FAR 23.561: the human
body is far better able to withstand the deceleration force
subjected to the inertia forces prescribed in § 23.561 (b)(2) [see note
29 and accompanying text] for normal, utility, and acrobatic cate-
gory airplanes, by a safety belt and shoulder harness that is designed
to prevent the head from contacting any injurious object for each
forward-and aft-facing seat.
Id.
32 See 14 C.F.R. § 25.785(c) (1986).
133 In his article in 1983, Saba noted that there was no such requirement in the
FARs. See Saba, supra note 2, at 294-95.
1-4 Id. at 294. In 1964, the CAB studied 25 general aviation aircraft accidents
involving 826 fatalities. After the study, the CAB concluded that 200 of these
fatalities could have been avoided if the aircraft involved had been equipped with
shoulder harnesses for their passengers. SAFETY REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
i See SAFETY REPORT, supra note 3, at 2-6.
'"' 14 C.F.R. § 23.785(b)(1986); see also supra notes 121-126 and accompanying
text.
137 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
COMMENT
of a crash than the equipment designed to protect it.'" 8
When this is the case, otherwise survivable accidents will
result in avoidable injuries and deaths.131
It should be noted that many of the same dangers giv-
ing rise to passenger restraint systems also require that
the seats themselves be properly anchored to avoid being
broken loose from the floor by deceleration forces.
Clearly, safety belts and shoulder harnesses will be much
less effective (if effective at all) when the seats to which
they are attached break loose. 140 Once again, however,
the regulations provide that the seats be anchored to
withstand only those forces specified in FAR
23.561(b)(2).14 1
3. Post-Crash Hazards
The previous two sections dealt with FARs related to
the dynamic phase of the crash.' 42 This section will deal
with FARs related to the "static" phase. The static phase
of an accident occurs after the crash itself, when the pas-
sengers are engaged in an emergency evacuation of the
aircraft.143 During this time, any number of events may
result in injury and death to the passengers. 144 Of course,
a manufacturer may not be able to avoid a number of
these hazards, as they may result from such factors as "the
passengers' behavior, the exterior environment, the
weather, and the time of day or night of the crash."' 145
138 See supra text accompanying note 126.
-9 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
140 See D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 284.
14, 14 C.F.R. § 23.785(a)(1986). This subsection states that
[elach seat, berth, and its supporting structure, must be designed for
occupants weighing at least 170 pounds ..., and for the maximum
load factors corresponding to the specified flight and ground load
conditions, including the emergency landing conditions prescribed
in § 23.561.
Id.
42 See supra notes 119-140 and accompanying text. The dynamic phase of the
crash is the period of initial impact. Saba, supra note 2, at 296.
14. Saba, supra note 2, at 296.
144 See infra notes 146-197 and accompanying text.
14. Saba, supra note 2, at 297.
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However, a number of factors affecting survivability dur-
ing this phase of a crash are well within the control of air-
craft manufacturers. 46 Two of the most important factors
are control of post-crash fires and design of the aircraft to
allow safe, rapid egress by the passengers.
a. Control of Post-Crash Fires
"Fire is the four-letter word of airline safety.' 47  In
fact, post-crash fires are quite likely, and may spread rap-
idly when large quantities of uncontained fuel are ig-
nited.148 Such fires are often responsible for a majority of
deaths in survivable crashes. 49 Aside from the heat of the
fire itself, many injuries and deaths may result from toxic
gases emitted by the flames, and from black smoke which
fills the cabin and so impairs visibility that passengers can-
not find their way to the emergency exits.15 0
FAR 23.1191 addresses these hazards by requiring that
each engine on a general aviation aircraft be isolated from
the rest of the aircraft by a firewall.' 51 These firewalls
must be fireproof, 52 and must be constructed so that "no
hazardous quantity of liquid, gas, or flame can pass from
the engine compartment to other parts of the air-
plane".' 53 In order to comply with FAR 23.1191, a fire-
wall must be able to resist flame penetration for at least
140 Id.
147 Nolan, supra note 1, at 38.
148 Saba, supra note 2, at 299.
,49 See Bullock, Survivability in Aircraft Fires: New Standards are Needed, 34 INTER-
AVIA 557 (1979). The author notes that 95 percent of air crash fatalities occur
when a post-crash fire is involved and that, of these fatalities, 40 percent may be
attributed to the fire itself. Id. For specific instances in which fires have resulted
in literally hundreds of deaths in survivable crashes, see Nolan, supra note 1, at 38.
.. Nolan, supra note 1, at 38-41; see also D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 29.
14 C.F.R. § 23.1191 (1986). Subsection (a) states that "[e]ach engine, auxil-
iary power unit, fuel burning heater, and other combustion equipment intended
for operation in fight, must be isolated from the rest of the airplane by firewalls,
shrouds, or equivalent means." Id. § 23.1191(a). 14 C.F.R. § 25.1181 (1986)
contains a similar provision for commercial aviation aircraft.
'.2 Id. § 23.1191(e).
-. Id. § 23.1191(b).
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fifteen minutes 54 at a temperature of 1950 degrees to
2050 degrees Fahrenheit.' 55 If these firewalls work as
they should, any fire in the engine or fuel tank will not
spread into the occupied parts of the aircraft before the
passengers exit safely. The safety features required by
FAR 23.1191 appear to be adequate,' 56 but they have, in
fact, failed to achieve the level of safety for which they
were designed. 157
While FAR 23.1191 regulates the ability of the aircraft
to isolate any engine fire from the cabin, another provi-
sion, FAR 23.853, addresses the ability of the cabin's inte-
rior to withstand any fire which originates in or reaches
the area. 158 The provision simply states that the materials
for each compartment used by the crew or passengers
must be flame-resistant.'5 9 In addition, FAR 23.853 speci-
fies means to avoid cigarette fires by dictating that no
lines, tanks, or equipment containing flammable fluids
may be installed in passenger compartments unless they
are installed in such a manner that their failure would not
create a fire hazard. 60 The regulation further states that
any materials on the cabin side of a firewall must be either
self-extinguishing or located at such a distance from the
firewall that they will not ignite when the firewall is sub-
jected to a flame temperature of "not less than 2000 de-
grees F for 15 minutes".' 6'
The provisions of FAR 23.853 are primarily prophylac-
tic, and in fact, may fail to provide adequate protection to
passengers once a fire has started in the cabin, or has pen-
1 Id. § 23.1191(g).
,55 Id. § 23.1191(f)(1).
156 For instance the 2000 degree Fahrenheit requirement may, in fact, be suffi-
cient to contain most fuel fires, because fuel fires usually burn at a temperature
somewhere between 1700 degrees and 2000 degrees Fahrenheit. See
D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 290.
157 See id.
158 14 C.F.R. § 23.853 (1986).
,-9 Id. § 23.853(a).
-60 Id. § 23.853(d).
61 Id. § 23.853(e). This should serve to protect the cabin for as long as the
firewall itself will hold up. See id. § 23.1191 (g).
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etrated the cabin from without.1 62 When exposed to heat,
many nonmetallic cabin materials, such as curtains, car-
pets, and seat cushions, emit toxic gases. 63 These gases
may asphyxiate the passengers, or rise and collect along
the ceiling where they may ignite, engulfing the entire
cabin in flames. 64 Despite these dangers, the FAA has
not issued a single rule regarding toxic gas emissions in
well over a decade. 165
b. Design Factors Allowing Safe Egress
Clearly, safe exit from the crashed aircraft must be the
ultimate objective of those who are concerned with crash-
worthy design. Construction of firewalls and other safety
mechanisms is of little worth if the passengers aboard a
crashed aircraft cannot exit within the extra time these de-
vices will afford. Therefore, as a necessary complement to
the safety concerns already discussed, aircraft manufac-
turers must design their products to allow hasty exit by
the passengers in the event of an emergency. 66
One of the primary concerns in providing for the safe
exit of passengers after a crash is designing and construct-
ing a sufficient number of operable emergency exits. 67
The key word here is "operable." Often, the force of a
crash will deform the exterior of the aircraft, causing
emergency exit doors to jam.' 68 When this occurs, pas-
sengers have no quick means of escape, and may fall vic-
tim to post-crash fires or other hazards. 169 Even if the
doors are operable after the crash, they may be too small
or the procedure to open them may be too complex. 70
... D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 290-91.
1;, Id. at 296.
I14 Id.
... See Saba, supra note 2, at 300.
6,4; See D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 285.
167 Bullock, supra note 148, at 558.
, D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 286.
See Nolan, supra note 1, at 44. "When a Pan Am 707 crash-landed and
burned in Pago Pago in January 1974, only four passengers survived. The bodies
of the rest were found piled up behind a forward door that never opened." Id.
170 Saba, supra note 2, at 298-99. To add to the confusion, emergency door
To deal with these concerns, the FAA promulgated
FAR 23.807.171 This regulation provides that each air-
craft must have a sufficient number of emergency exits
which are "located to allow escape without crowding in
any probable crash attitude."'' 72 These exits must be
large enough to provide an unobstructed opening
through which an object measuring nineteen-by-twenty-
six inches could pass.173 In addition, the exits must be
readily accessible,174 simple to open, 175 easy to locate,'
76
and reasonably difficult to jam. 177
. FAR 23.807, though it provides necessary standards for
emergency exits, contains no objective criteria by which to
judge compliance with these standards. 78 When is a
method of opening "simple and obvious?"' 179 What are
"reasonable provisions against jamming by fuselage def-
ormation?"'180 The regulation is silent as to these ques-
tions, simply stating that operators must periodically
conduct "tests" to determine the proper functioning of
each emergency exit.' 8' However, there is no provision
specifying the manner of criteria to be used on these
"tests."' 18 2 As a result of their enigmatic nature, the provi-
sions of FAR 23.807 provide little guidance.
While FAR 23.807 is of little guidance in providing ob-
jective criteria concerning safe evacuation of a crashed
aircraft, FAR 25.803, which deals with emergency evacua-
handles in aircraft may look like "levers or switches" rather than handles, and may
be located at some distance from the door itself. D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at
286.
171 14 C.F.R. § 23.807 (1986).
172 Id. § 23.807(a).
. Id. § 23.807(b).
174 Id. § 23.807(b)(1).
,7- Id. § 23.807(b)(2).
.... Id. § 23.807(b)(3).
1 Id. § 23.807(b)(4).
178 D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 285.
.... See 14 C.F.R. § 23.807(b)(2) (1986).
... See id. § 23.807(b)(4).
'' Id. § 23.807(c).
1'8 D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 285.
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tion, contains much more detailed requirements.18 3 This
regulation specifies that an aircraft with a seating capacity
of at least forty-four passengers must undergo a demon-
stration to show that all passengers on board may evacu-
ate from the aircraft to the ground within ninety
seconds.' 84 FAR 25.803 imposes a number of require-
ments so that these demonstrations may best simulate real
life conditions in the event of a crash. 85  For instance,
these demonstrations must be conducted "in the dark of
the night" or in simulated darkness conditions during
daylight hours. 86 In addition, the demonstration "pas-
senger" group must contain a specified percentage of
female, 8 7 juvenile, 88 and elderly' 89 "passengers."' 9 ° Fi-
nally, the "passengers" in the demonstration must have
access to no more than fifty percent of the emergency ex-
its in the aircraft,' 9 ' with no prior information as to which
exits will and will not be available for use. 192
On its face, FAR 25.803 appears to provide reasonable
assurance that manufacturers who comply with its provi-
sions will produce airplanes that can be evacuated before
183 See 14 C.F.R. § 25.803 (1986).
184 See id. § 25.803(c)(1)-(20).
1'" Id. § 25.803(c).
186 Id. § 25.803(c)(1).
187 Id. § 25.803(c)(8)(i). At least 30 percent of the "passengers" must be fe-
male. Id.
188 Id. § 25.803(c)(8)(iii). Between five and ten percent of the "passengers"
must be under the age of 12. Id.
189 Id. § 25.803(c)(8)(ii). At least five percent of the "passengers" must be over
60 years of age. Id.
190 It is important to note that "crewmembers, mechanics, and training person-
nel who maintain or operate the airplane in the normal course of their duties" are
not eligible to serve as "passengers" for these demonstrations. Id.
§ 25.803(c)(8)(v).
Id. § 25.803(c)(17). This subsection further states,
Exits that are not to be used in the demonstration must have the exit
handle deactivated or must be indicated by red lights, red tapes, or
other acceptable means, placed outside the exits to indicate fire or
other reason why they are unusable. The exits to be used must be
representative of all the emergency exits on the airplane and must
be designated by the applicant, subject to approval by the Adminis-
trator. At least one floor level exit must be used.
Id.
,9See Nolan, supra note 1, at 44.
post-crash hazards result in injury or death to the passen-
gers. 93 This is not to say, however, that these airplanes
will be evacuated before disaster strikes in the event of a
real crash. In a sense, safe evacuation in a real crash is
largely conditioned upon the extent to which all of the
other crashworthiness features 194 of the aircraft are effec-
tive,'l 5 and the extent to which the passengers are able to
remain calm and follow emergency directions. 196 It is im-




Crashworthiness FAR's issued by the FAA provide
nothing more than minimum safety standards. 198 Many of
these standards are either so low or so vague that they fail
to provide any type of adequate protection for aircraft
passengers who are unfortunate enough to become in-
volved in aviation accidents. 199 As a result, these regula-
tions, as they exist presently, are simply not suited to
serve as standards for liability in tort actions based upon
injuries or deaths in crashes. To build an aircraft which
meets FAA crashworthiness standards is not necessarily to
build a crashworthy aircraft. Fortunately, many courts
193 See 14 C.F.R. § 25.803(c)(13) (1986).
'- See supra notes 118-182 and accompanying text.
1o5 See D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 296. For instance, the burn-through time
for an exterior fuel fire may be as little as thirty to forty seconds. Id. When fire
penetrates the cabin so quickly, it will be virtually impossible for all the passen-
gers to evacuate safely, regardless of any ability to evacuate within ninety seconds.
Id.
19o These demonstrations "assume" that the passengers of a crashed aircraft
will have ninety seconds in which to evacuate safely. See 14 C.F.R.
§ 25.803(c)(1986). In a real crash, the passengers may not have ninety seconds.
In addition, the passengers in a real crash may be fighting for their lives. Because
their situation is so serious, fear and panic may overcome rationality, and the
evacuation process may be chaotic and confused. See Nolan, supra note 1, at 43-
44. On the other hand, the passengers in a demonstration evacuation do not fear
for their lives, and, therefore, do not allow panic to slow their progress to the
nearest means of exit. See id.
197 See supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
1" See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
'i' See supra notes 116-197 and accompanying text.
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have recognized this, and have not accorded FAR's the
status of absolute standards in litigation based upon the
doctrine of crashworthiness. 0 0
B. The "Consumer Expectations" Standard
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
states that a product is defective, for purposes of that sec-
tion, when it is dangerous beyond what a consumer with
"ordinary knowledge common to the community" would
contemplate. 20' This standard is quite vague, lending it-
self to inconsistent application.20 2 In addition, this stan-
dard has a number of limitations which may make it
difficult to apply.20 3 First, application of this standard in
design defect cases would "short-circuit the analytic pro-
cess" by failing to consider what risk-utility factors20 4 re-
sulted in the manufacturer's design choice.20 5 Because
the standard focuses upon the ordinary consumer's
knowledge, rather than the reasonableness of the manu-
facturer's design choice, disposition of a case is a rather
routine matter once the court determines what an ordi-
nary consumer's expectations are. 0 6
2- See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446 (1976).
20, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). This section
states, by way of example, that "[g]ood whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous
[and therefore defective] merely because it will make some people drunk, and is
especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous
amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous." Id.
202 Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to
Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611 (1980). The author points
out that one of the points upon which courts, in applying the consumer expecta-
tions test, differ is that of whether the term "ordinary consumer" is "a hypotheti-
cal construct ... or whether it is the actual plaintiff in the action at bar." Id. at
611. Compare Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69
Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (objective test) with Young v. Tide Craft, 270
S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978) (subjective test).
203 Saba, supra note 2, at 322; see also Birnbaum, supra note 202, at 613.
2- For a discussion of risk-utility factors, see infra notes 215-228 and accompa-
nying text.
210.5 Birnhaum, supra note 202, at 613.
206 Id. This standard also creates the risk that consumers or users may not re-
cover where the court finds that the dangers inherent in the product are patently
obvious. Id. In such instances, there would be no mechanism by which to provide
an incentive to the manufacturer to produce a safer product. Id.
Secondly, it is often difficult for a judge or jury to ascer-
tain the reasonable expectations of a consumer, especially
where "the defect is latent and the product complicated in
design,"'2 0 7 as is the case with today's general and com-
mercial aviation aircraft. 0 Indeed, this standard assumes
that consumers will have expectations as to the safety of
certain products, which, in fact they may not have.20 9
Thus, in the case of aircraft design, passengers may not
have any idea as to how safely the aircraft could, or
should, have been made,2 10 and a jury may simply be
forced to "guess." ' 1t
Finally, use of this standard could conceivably result in
a situation in which a court would refuse to find a product
defective even though it had not met specific minimum
safety requirements specified by a legislative or adminis-
trative body. 2  Thus, a court, in applying this standard,
would refuse to consider even the minimal requirements
of aircraft crashworthiness FAR's if it found that "ordi-
nary expectations" of aircraft passengers fell below the
standards embodied therein. 13 On the other hand, the
expectations of consumers may reach far beyond available
technical expertise, in which case strict adherence to this
standard would penalize the manufacturer for its failure
to do the impossible.2 14
C. The Risk-Utility Balancing Standard
According to this approach, all products have certain
207 Id. at 614.
208 Saba, supra note 2, at 323.
2 9 Birnbaum, supra note 202, at 614.
210 Saba, supra note 2, at 323.
211 Birnbaum, supra note 202, at 614; see also Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on
the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV.
803, 823 (1976).
212 Saba, supra note 2, at 323-24.
213 See id. Where the manufacturer violated FAR's, it would normally be consid-
ered negligent per se. Id.
214 See id.
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risks and benefits. 15 In order to determine whether a
given product is defective, a court would weigh the dan-
ger-in-fact, or risk, of the product against its utility.2 16 If
the former tips heavier on the scale than the latter, the
product will be considered defective.21 7
The most widespread approach to this standard, known
as the "reasonably prudent manufacturer" approach, is
similar (indeed, almost identical) to a traditional negli-
gence approach. l8 In fact, the only real difference be-
tween the two is the requirement of scienter (knowledge
of the dangerous nature of the product) in the former.21 9
The scienter requirement under the "reasonably prudent
manufacturer" approach is easily satisfied, however, be-
cause scienter is automatically imputed to the manufac-
turer.2 Once this requirement is met, the court must
then engage in the risk-utility balance to determine
whether the product is defective.22 ' If the court deter-
mines, on balance, that a reasonable person would find
that the inherent risk of the product in its present condi-
tion outweighs its utility, the product will be deemed un-
215 Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law - A Review of Basic Prin-
ciples, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 592 (1980).
2- Id. Dean Keeton noted that there are three important factors affecting utility
of design: (1) "an evaluation of the needs, wants, or desires that are served by the
product," (2) "the technological and economic feasibility, and practicability, of
serving the need with alternative products," and (3) "the technological and eco-
nomic feasibility of serving society's needs with a safer product." Id. at 592-93.
217 Id. at 592.
2,1 See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 15 (1965).
219 Id; see also Birnbaum, supra note 202, at 619.
220 See Saba, supra note 2, at 327. There is a difference of opinion between the
two leading proponents of this approach as to when scienter will be imputed to the
manufacturer. Dean Wade would impute scienter to the manufacturer at the time
the product is manufactured. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Prod-
ucts, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-40 (1973) [hereinafter Wade II]. Dean Keeton, on the
other hand, would impute scienter to the manufacturer at the time of trial. See
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design
of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 568 (1969) [hereinafter Keeton II]. Thus,
under Dean Keeton's approach, a product will be considered unreasonably dan-
gerous, and therefore defective, if, at the time of the trial, a reasonable manufac-
turer would recognize the risk it presents, even if the risk of danger could not have
been known at the time of manufacture. See id. at 568.
221 Saba, sura note 2, at 325.
reasonably dangerous and, therefore, defective. 22
Despite certain advantages to the application of this ap-
proach,223 there are several limitations. 4 First of all, ap-
plication of this standard would not provide an incentive
for manufacturers to improve the safety of their prod-
ucts. 225 If, under this approach, the manufacturer can es-
cape liability where, on balance, the risk of danger from
the product does not exceed its utility, then manufactur-
ers will not be encouraged to improve safety in situations
where injuries might not be as numerous.226
Secondly, manufacturers may well perceive that the pre-
sumption of scienter against them is unfair, and that they
are being forced to absorb too much of the costs resulting
from accidents.227 Finally, given the extremely technical
nature of modern aircraft, it may be virtually impossible
for a jury to make a truly informed decision as to the rea-
sonability of a conscious design choice on the part of an
aircraft manufacturer. 22 8
D. Preliminary Conclusions
As this section shows, there are no universally accepta-
ble standards for the courts to use when deciding aircraft
crashworthiness cases. Each of the alternatives discussed
above has, along with its advantages, substantial limita-
tions upon its effectiveness in the context of such litiga-
tion. In the absence of acceptable standards the courts
have looked to all three of the above standards, and have
failed to provide a definitive standard with which to mea-
222 Id.
223 This approach does have the advantage of encouraging "a relatively scientific
and objective examination of the design of the product by focusing the court's
attention toward the product itself in the context of certain given criteria." Id. at
326. Also, the presumption of scienter serves to ease the plaintiff's burden of
proof. Id.
224 Id.
225 Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEX.
L. REV. 81, 93 (1973).
226 See id.
227 Saba, supra note 2, at 326-27.
228 See Note, supra note 31, at 401.
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sure the efforts of aircraft manufacturers in the area of
safety.229
IV. STATE OF THE ART AND MANUFACTURERS' RESPONSE
While FAA regulations have remained unchanged 230
and the courts have remained reluctant to pursue the mat-
ter of crashworthiness in aviation cases,2 3' technology in
the area of crashworthy design has progressed tremen-
dously.232 However, aircraft manufacturers have yet to
incorporate much of the new technology into their prod-
ucts, primarily due to cost. 233
A. Passenger Restraint Systems
As mentioned earlier, a primary cause of injury and
death in aircraft crashes is the failure of seats and seat
belts to restrain the passengers during deceleration.234 In
fact, seat design has progressed far beyond the minimum
"g's" requirement embodied in FAR 23.785.235 Many
years ago, NASA tested an airplane seat which was
designed to hold up to forty-five "g's. ' '2 36 More recently,
Simula, Inc., a firm which builds high-tech seats for mili-
tary helicopters, has developed a seat which is flexible
enough to absorb eighteen "g's" without breaking, and
which may be sturdily attached to the cabin floor by a duc-
tile, load-limiting tract fitting.2 37 Crashworthy seats and
seatbelts are not novel items. In fact, the Department of
Transportation requires that automobile safety belts be
229 See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446-47 (applied the "con-
sumer expectations" test, but held that FAR's were persuasive evidence of the
level of safety that consumers could reasonably expect); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (applied the "risk-utility balance" approach).
2-.o See, e.g., supra note 124 and accompanying text.
2-.1 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
2.12 See infra notes 234-266 and accompanying text.
2'.1. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
". See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
2' See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
2.11; Nolan, supra note 1, at 37.
2.47 Id.
able to withstand twenty-nine "g's. ' ' 238 In addition to im-
proving seat strength, research has shown that aft-facing
seats239 and double strap shoulder harnesses2 40 tend to
protect passengers more than forward-facing seats and
single strap harnesses.
Despite continued testing and research, most airplane
seats in use today are designed to withstand no more than
the minimum "g's" requirement. 4 1 Manufacturers and
operators have rejected the sturdier models largely be-
cause they tend to weigh more than the traditional mod-
els.242 In commercial aviation especially, extra weight
results in extra fuel costs.2 43
B. Post-Crash Fires
One of the primary dangers in a plane crash is the pos-
sibility of fire. 244 Post-crash fires are usually due to a fuel
leak. 245 Today most Army helicopters use rupture-resis-
tant fuel tanks made of a tough, rubber-like material. 4 6
These tanks are designed to remain intact upon impact in
a crash. During their use, the number of post-crash fires
dropped by seventy-five percent and, of 2500 army heli-
copter crashes, only two people were killed by fire.247 In
addition to puncture-resistant tanks, the FAA and NASA
have tested fuel additives which appear to be a promising
means of reducing the likelihood that leaked fuel will
ignite. 48
While the above devices may lessen the odds of a post-
2-8 Schaden, supra note 6, at 43. The U.S. Navy standard is 40 "g's" for its
aircraft. Id.
2'3. See Nolan, supra note 1, at 37.
24 See D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 280.
24, Nolan, supra note 1, at 33.
242 See id. at 37.
24- Id. Commercial airline operators are highly concerned about extra weight,
because "each excess ounce costs about a gallon of extra fuel a year." Id.
244 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
24 See Saba, supra note 2, at 299.
24' Nolan, supra note 1, at 39.
247 Id.
248 Id. One of the latest tests of a new fuel additive known as FM-9 was not
successful, however. Id. at 40.
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crash fire occurring, other devices may minimize the
harmful effects of smoke in the event that a fire develops.
Fire-resistant upholstery materials, such as a Du Pont neo-
prene foam called Vonar, have long been available.249 In
addition, there are devices known as smoke hoods, which
may give a passenger breathing time of fifteen to twenty
minutes in the event that the cabin is filled with toxic
gases. 0
Despite the existence of the above safety features, few
manufacturers or operators use them. Most modern air-
craft are designed with aluminum fuel tanks, which rup-
ture upon even the most minor impact.25 1 In addition,
most airplane seats are upholstered with urethane foam,
which gives off thick smoke and lethal gasses when
heated.2 52 Manufacturers and operators tend to prefer
the urethane to the neoprene because the former is much
lighter.253 Finally, the airline industry has ardently op-
posed use of smoke hoods, and, consequently, they are
not standard equipment on any aircraft.254
C. Factors Allowing Safe Egress
Again, it is important that passengers safely exit an air-
craft as soon as possible after a crash in order to avoid
injury in post-crash fires and other hazards. 55 One of the
most important safety considerations in this regard is seat
spacing.2 56 If the aisles are too narrow, evacuating pas-
sengers may clog them creating serious and costly delays
in the evacuation process. 57 Unfortunately, however,
commercial aircraft manufacturers and operators have in-
240 Id. at 41.
250 Id. at 41-43.
25 Id. at 38.
252 Id. at 40.
253 Id. at 40-41.
254 Id. at 43. In 1969, the FAA proposed mandatory smoke hoods, but the air-
lines successfully protested that such smoke hoods would impede evacuation. Id.
255 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
256 Saba, supra note 2, at 298.
2.7 Id. For example, a study of a 1961 airplane crash found that some of the
deaths were attributable to the narrow aisles, which made it impossible for attend-
creased the seating capacities of most of their airplanes in
order to fit more passengers. 258 This has resulted in aisle
space shrinking from an average of about thirty-four in-
ches a few years ago to twenty-nine inches today.25 9
Aside from seat spacing concerns, there is evidence that
aircraft manufacturers and operators do not fully comply
with the evacuation demonstration prescribed by FAR
25.803.260 A flight attendant who participated in an evac-
uation demonstration testified at congressional hearings
on airline safety that the "passengers" in the demonstra-
tion were mostly airline employees, whose jobs depended
upon the aircraft passing the ninety second test. 26' Fur-
ther, although no one told these "passengers" which exits
would be operable, they easily guessed that the operable
exits were those with the video cameras above.262 Conse-
quently, they easily carried out the evacuation within the
required ninety seconds.263 This testimony led one Con-
gressman to characterize the evacuation test as a "farce"
and a "charade.1' 264
D. Evaluation of Manufacturers' and Operators' Efforts
Concerning Crashworthiness
Overall, aircraft manufacturers have failed to ade-
quately incorporate existing technology into their prod-
ucts to make them more crashworthy. "Today's aircraft,
both private and commercial, contain numerous
crashworthiness defects. '"265 Despite the existence and
availability of technological improvements in the area of
air safety, aircraft manufacturers and operators have not
been encouraged to exceed the insufficient and outdated
ants to go forward and move passengers back to an emergency exit located in the
rear. Id.
2-" Nolan, supra note 1, at 43.
25) Id.
2(; See supra notes 183-197 and accompanying text.




265 D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 269.
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requirements contained in the various FARs which deal
with crashworthiness. 6 6 Of course, failure to incorporate
existing technology into today's commercial and general
aviation aircraft is not the result of a desire on the part of
these manufacturers to produce dangerous products.
Rather, it is the end result of a process in which a number
of competing considerations go into the decision of how
to build the aircraft. Unfortunately, it seems that
crashworthiness features are all too often cast aside to the
detriment of those who may find themselves in dire need
of these safety features in a future crash.
V. CONCLUSION
Having determined that certain apsects of modern air-
craft design and operation often needlessly endanger pas-
sengers in the event of an accident, we must decide upon
a course of conduct that takes this determination into ac-
count. In this regard, there are a number of alternatives
available.
Perhaps one alternative would be to simply ignore the
numerous injuries and deaths that occur each year and re-
ject the doctrine of crashworthiness as it would pertain to
general and commercial aviation aircraft. No doubt, this
approach would save aircraft manufacturers and opera-
tors a considerable amount of money by freeing them
from liability for these injuries and deaths. This, in turn,
would greatly economize air travel as manufacturers and
operators could pass these savings on to passengers
through lower fares. However, despite the econonic
"benefits" which could be derived from this approach, the
social "costs" could be quite substantial. 67 Virtually
every jurisdiction in the United States has recognized the
need to impose liability upon automobile manufacturers
where automobile design features result in foreseeable in-
,' For a discussion of the requirements contained in the FARs, see supra notes
111-200 and accompanying text.
267 The social "costs" are the injuries and deaths resulting from aviation acci-
dents. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
COMMENT
juries during accidents.268 Presumably, the imposition of
liability in such instances serves to provide economic in-
centives for automobile manufacturers to produce safer
automobiles and to compensate specific victims whose in-
juries resulted from a defective automobile design. 269 As
noted earlier, it is virtually impossible to distinguish air-
craft from automobiles for the purpose of furthering
these policy considerations.2 70 To attempt to do so could
create precisely the results in the aviation context that
courts applying the doctrine of crashworthiness to auto-
mobile claims have sought to avoid in the automobile con-
text: uncompensated victims and fewer safety features. As
a result, this alternative is not acceptable.
Another alternative would be to apply the doctrine of
crashworthiness in the aviation context through the judi-
cial system.271 This approach would certainly further an
important policy consideration underlying the doctrine of
strict liability by providing compensation to accident vic-
tims and spreading the costs of their injuries to other con-
sumers. 2 72 However, it would do little to further the goal
of providing an incentive for manufacturers to produce
safer products.7 3 In a sense, the "safety incentive" effect
of aviation crashworthiness litigation on the manufacturer
has an inverse relationship with the airworthiness of the
manufacturer's aircraft. As the airworthiness of a manu-
facturer's airplane increases (which has been the rule in
the last few years), the manufacturer's incentive to en-
hance crashworthiness decreases, because the manufacturer
will be subject to fewer crashworthiness claims. When the
manufacturer weighs the cost of avoiding liability through
added crashworthiness safety features with the costs of ac-
268 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
270 See supra note 32.
271 See supra notes 29-108 for a discussion of judicial decisions regarding the
doctrine of crashworthiness in the aviation context.
2 72 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
272 See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "safety-in-
centive" policy of strict liability.
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tual liability in crashworthiness actions when they occur, it
may well find that the former outweigh the latter. In this
instance it would be less expensive simply to pay for
deaths and injuries than to prevent them.274 Perhaps the
only way to avoid this result would be to develop a means
by which a manufacturer could be immediately sanctioned
for building, selling, or operating an uncrashworthy air-
craft, regardless of whether the short-coming actually re-
sulted in loss of life or health to passengers.
In addition to its failure to provide a sufficient incentive
for manufacturers to incorporate safety features, another
problem with judicial disposition of crashworthiness
claims is that technical design choices may be matters best
left to those with expertise in the area. Often,
crashworthiness features are rejected due to a number of
factors (including airworthiness considerations) which a
judge or jury focusing on the single factor of crashworthi-
ness could not appreciate.275
Finally, another alternative would be to create an adju-
dicative body "composed of existing governmental agen-
cies and aircraft manufacturers" in order to determine
whether a manufacturer should be subject to liability
under the doctrine of crashworthiness in a given case. 276
This body would include representatives from NASA, the
FAA, and the NTSB, as well as the aircraft industry it-
self.277 It would establish "clear," "precise," and "up to
date" minimum requirements as to crashworthiness and
use those requirements as absolute standards in deter-
mining the liability of aircraft manufacturers in
crashworthiness cases.278 All in all, this alternative is very
214 See Nolan, supra note 1, at 51. The author discusses a scenario in which an
airline executive concludes that crashworthiness liability would reach about one
million dollars per year, while expenses to install crashworthiness features could
run as much as five million dollars per year. See id.
21-5 Note, supra note 31, at 402.
27.. Id. at 404.
.27 Id. at 404-05.
27" Id. at 405. "A finding of compliance with these standards would be conclu-
sive evidence that the aircraft was crashworthy. A finding that the manufacturer
attractive. It would provide an efficient means of dealing
with disputes, while providing relatively clear guidelines
which the manufacturers could follow. However, it does
have its own problems. First, it does not address the
"safety insurance" problem identified earlier, 279 because
it would operate to sanction a manufacturer only when an
injured party brings suit. 28 0 Perhaps this could be reme-
died if the panel had the power to issue fines for failure to
comply with the crashworthiness regulations indepen-
dently of any accident adjudication. Secondly, it seems a
bit optimistic to believe that the FAA and the aircraft in-
dustry will suddenly be moved to promulgate up-to-date
standards when they have virtually refused to budge from
the standards they promulgated over thirty years ago, de-
spite repeated criticism regarding their inadequacy.2 8' Fi-
nally, leaving the matter of adjudicating crashworthiness
disputes up to the industry and its federal regulators may,
in fact, be "letting the fox guard the chicken coop." Over
the years, the industry and the FAA have developed a
close working relationship through which the former has
wielded a great deal of influence over the latter.282
Doubtless, the industry has been outspoken in its desire
to avoid crashworthiness standards which are more strin-
gent than those which currently exist. Adjudication by a
judicial court would provide an independent player in the
field of crashworthiness which could approach the prob-
lem from a different perspective. However, creation of
this proposed administrative body would not necessarily
deprive the courts of review, because a court of appeals
could presumably have jurisdiction to review its decisions
as it does those of other administrative tribunals.8 3 De-
failed to comply with these standards, however, would subject the manufacturer
to liability under a negligence per se doctrine." Id.
279 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
280 Id.
28 See, e.g., D.CATHCART, supra note 14, at 269-98; Saba, supra note 2, at 291-
300.
282 See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 1, at 43.
28- Also, presumably, the question of damages would be left to a judicial court
after the panel had determined liability. Note, supra note 31, at 405.
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spite its problems, this approach is, perhaps, the most at-
tractive alternative available.
Casenotes and
Statute Notes

